Harming Future Persons
-14 %
download
Der Artikel wird am Ende des Bestellprozesses zum Download zur Verfügung gestellt.

Harming Future Persons

 Ebook
Sofort lieferbar| Lieferzeit:3-5 Tage I

Unser bisheriger Preis:ORGPRICE: 206,95 €

Jetzt 178,49 €*

ISBN-13:
9781402056970
Einband:
Ebook
Seiten:
335
Serie:
International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
EPUB
Kopierschutz:
1 - PDF Watermark
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:
"Introduction.- 1.The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem.- 2. Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives.- 3. Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist.- 4. Who Cares About Identity?- 5. Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternative Possible Identities?- 6. Rule Consequentialism and Non-Identity.- 7. Harming As Causing Harm.- 8. Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions.- 9. Harming and Procreating.- 10. The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When Is One Act Better for a Person Than Another?- 11. Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-Identity Problem.- 12. Two Varieties of "Better-For" Judgements.- 13. Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions.- 14. Can the Person-Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?- 15. Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty.- 16. Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice Over Time."
"Introduction by M. A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman.-

I. Can Bringing a Person into Existence Harm That Person? Can an Act That Harms No One Be Wrong?.- 1. The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem by David Heyd.-

II. If Bringing a Worse Off Person into Existence Is Wrong, Is Not Bringing a Better Off Person into Existence Also Wrong?.- 2. Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives by Ingmar Persson.- 3. Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist by Jeff McMahan.-

III. Must an Act Worse for People Be Worse for a Particular Person?.- 4. Who Cares About Identity? By Nils Holtug.- 5. Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternative Possible Identities? By Clark Wolf.- 6. Rule Consequentialism and Non-Identity by Tim Mulgan.-

IV. Is the Inference to "No Harm Done" Correct? Must an Act That Harms a Person Make That Person Worse Off?.- 7. Harming As Causing Harm by Elizabeth Harman.- 8. Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions by Bonnie Steinbock.- 9. Harming and Procreating by Matthew Hanser.- 10. The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When Is One Act Better for a Person Than Another? By M. A. Roberts.-

V. Is the Morality of Parental Reproductive Choice Special? Can Intentions and Attitudes Make an Act that Harms No One Wrong?.- 11. Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-Identity Problem by Hallvard Lillehammer.- 12. Two Varieties of "Better-For" Judgements by Peter Herissone-Kelly.- 13. Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions by David T. Wasserman.-

VI. Is the Person-Affecting Approach Objectionable Independent of the Nonidentity Problem?.- 14. Can the Person-Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics? By Gustaf Arrhenius.- VII. What Are the Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for Law and Public Policy?.- 15. Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty by Philip G. Peters, Jr..- 16. Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice Over Time by Seana Valentine Shiffrin."
Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogetherthat is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future personspersons who dont yet but will existin accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awfulnot worth havingcan be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.