Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945
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Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945

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Christopher Andrew
432 g
210x149x19 mm

Foreword, vii; Abbreviations, ix; Introduction: Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945 Christopher Andrew, 1; Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900-1939 Christopher Andrew, 9; 1914: The Safety of Ciphers and the Outbreak of the First World War Jean Stengers, 29; The Surveillance of Indian 'Seditionists' in North America, 1905-1915 Richard Popplewell, 49; Intelligence and its Interpretation: Mesopotamia 1914-1916 Peter Morris, 77; Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp, 103; Japanese Intelligence 1894-1922 Ian Nish, 127; Japanese Intelligence 1919-1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment J. W. M. Chapman, 145; French Military Intelligence and the Coming of War 1935-1939 Anthony Adamthwaite, 191; British Intelligence in the Second World War F. H. Hinsley, 209; The Evolution of the JIC System Up to and During World War II Edward Thomas, 219; Army Ultra in the Mediterranean Theatre: Darkness and Light Ralph Bennett, 235; British Naval Intelligence in Two World Wars Patrick Beesly, 253; The Operational Use of 'ULTRA' in the Battle of the Atlantic Jurgen Rohwer, 275; The Tottering Giant: German Perceptions of Soviet Military and Economic Strength in Preparation for 'Operation Blau' (1942) Bernd Wegner, 293; Notes on Contributors, 313.
The essays in this volume assess the influence of intelligence on the Second World War and open up a number of other important areas for research. Studies of the growth of the imperial intellignece network cast new light on subjects ranging from Canadian surveillance of Vancouver Sikhs to signals intelligence in the Middle East. Studies of Japanese intelligence indicate the significance of Asian intelligence systems as a factor in modern international relations.
A number of contributors emphasize the slowness with which governments and high commands learned to assess and use the intelligence they received.
Contributions by
Anthony Adamthwaite, Christopher Andrew, Patrick Beesly, Ralph Bennett, Dr John W. M. Chapman, Sir Harry Hinsley, Dr Keith Jeffery, Dr Peter Morris, Ian Nish, Jeremy Noakes, Richard Popplewell, Professor Jürgen Rohwer, Dr Alan Sharp, Jean Stengers, E. E. Thomas and Dr Bernd Wegner